IN the second of a series of four articles on the Union and how to save it, Tom Miers argues the political settlement Scotland enjoys gives it more say, not less, over the key domestic and international affairs that affect the country.
A KEY ELEMENT of the Anglo-Scottish Union agreed in 1707 was that Scotland would retain control of the key domestic matters that defined its national identity and governed society. A crucial moment in the negotiations was when the Church of Scotland (which had hitherto been suspicious of Union) secured its independence in the legislation. This may seem a marginal issue to us now, but in those days it was very much a central consideration. Education (schools and universities), the Law and the Kirk were closely intertwined and were among the main institutions that governed day-to-day life.
They didn’t need much legislative oversight because law was seen in early modern times as a framework for individuals and institutions to deal with each other, rather than an activist tool to promote social change, as it is today. The fact that the Scottish Parliament no longer existed didn’t matter in this respect because there was room in the timetable of the united Parliament to make any necessary (and usually uncontroversial) adjustments to the legal framework in Scotland.
Today, of course, the situation is very different. In modern social democracies like Britain, the state is vast, accounting for nearly half of total expenditure. Activist governments have busy legislative programmes, forever reforming this or that institution and attempting to improve society through government action.
In the Twentieth Century, the question therefore arose: if politicians are now managing society and its institutions, which politicians should do that? The growth of state power undermined the Union in the sense that oversight of domestic matters moved from independent domestic institutions to activist politicians, and these politicians were based in London. Even Churchill made this point, though of course he used it as an argument against state power, rather than in favour of devolution.
Now that the big state is with us, in all its democratic glory, devolution makes sense in that it restores the original purpose of the Union settlement in retaining control over key domestic matters in Scotland. It can therefore be seen as a profoundly unionist measure in the context of our joint history from 1707.
Obviously, many unionists were (and are) suspicious of Holyrood because they saw it as a stepping-stone to independence. Indeed, the SNP has used the devolved institutions very successfully to promote the nationalist cause. But, desirable or not, Holyrood is here to stay, so their opponents should instead use it to promote the Union by presenting an alternative prospectus to the nationalists. For such is the range of powers held at Holyrood that the Scottish Government is in practice sovereign in most important respects.
The powers retained at the UK level – the detail of tax and welfare policy, trade, commercial regulation and so on – are either essential prerequisites for the operation of the UK single market (and would mostly be ceded to the UK or EU by and independent Scotland anyway) or else related foreign policy, over which Scotland has more practical sovereignty as part of the UK, as I explain below.
Aside from these, most of the levers of power are held in Scotland, including most of those that affect economic growth. In developed economies, prosperity is governed not by the details of the tax code, but by the quality of institutions – education, development planning, infrastructure, levels of crime, productivity in the public sector and so on. In Scotland these are largely devolved issues.
Even on tax, the Scottish Government has sufficient leeway to swim to either side of the band of possibilities that exist in a social democracy. Scotland could follow a centre-right lowish tax model or a high-tax / high-spend model. The leeway to do either is actually made greater by the generous financial settlement that the Union bestows on Scotland via the Barnett Formula.
The nationalists, of course, have a powerful motive to do nothing with these powers. They wish to demonstrate by this neglect that progress can only be made through independence. This approach has stagnated Scotland in a quagmire of failure – declining educational standards, low growth, poor health and even the collapse of cultural icons such as the Gaelic language.
In foreign policy, defence and international affairs generally, the Scottish Parliament is not sovereign. But the key insight of those who negotiated the Union all those centuries ago is that it never really was anyway. Before the Union, Scotland was at the mercy of international affairs and had no influence over the currents that affected it. Trying to join the burgeoning international trading system, Scotland fell victim to unscrupulous international rivals. By creating the Union, Scotland gained security, access to markets and at least some influence over the foreign policy that affected it.
The same calculation is true today.
An independent Scotland, just like equivalent sized countries across the developed world, would have no real say over the trading system, the policies of the western alliance (a factor brought into sharp relief with the Ukraine crisis) or environmental policy. As part of the UK, it does.
This canny arrangement was once, and should still be, a source of immense pride to Scots. Nationalists should be put to shame for hankering after a romanticised past when the Bargain we have in hand is so advantageous.
Which begs the question, what of the English? What do they get out of it? After all, the economics is not so clear cut. England makes significant fiscal transfers to Scotland (and Wales and Northern Ireland). The return in terms of a larger single market is, in proportion, not so great. The answer lies once again in the history books. In 1707 England was prepared to pay for the Union because it gained political stability within the British Isles and greater political heft abroad.
Nowadays sentiment – pride and affection in the UK and what its four nations have achieved together – is the reason usually given for the Union down South. And of course, sentiment has added to the many good reasons for the Union, making its justification stronger than ever. But when SNP politicians try to cause as much trouble for the rest of the UK as they can, exploiting constitutional anomalies, furthering confected grievance and insulting their neighbours, English voters should remember that the dissolution of the UK would result in a catastrophic loss of standing affecting all the constituent nations.
The rump UK would be relegated from its current position in the second tier of international players – equivalent broadly to France, Germany and Japan – to the third, alongside Spain, Canada, Italy and so on. Respected nations to be sure, but no longer capable of meaningful independent action and influence on the world stage. This would be a serious blow not just to England, but to the wider West. Which is why of course our enemies in Russia and elsewhere are so keen to promote Scottish nationalism.
The Bargain is published by Birlinn this Spring. Follow Tom Miers and The Bargain on Twitter @TomMiers1
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